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ABSTRACT 
 
We provide a theory to explain the existence of inequality in an economy where 
agents have identical preferences and have access to the same production technology. 
Agents consume a “utility” good and a “health” good which determines their 
subjective discount factor. Depending on initial distribution of capital the economy 
gets separated into different permanent-income groups. This leads to a testable 
hypothesis: “The rich save a larger proportion of their permanent income”. We test 
this implication for the savings behaviour in Australia. We show that even after 
controlling for life-cycle characteristics permanent income and savings are positively 
correlated. An improvement in the health leads to a positive effect on savings 
behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Household consumption and savings behaviour is an issue which remains at 
the heart of Macroeconomics. It is central to understanding the impact of tax 
and other government policies. It is also central to understanding the 
evolution of the wealth distribution. Researchers in this area have commonly 
used Freidman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis and Modigliani’s 
(1954) life-cycle hypothesis as a theoretical framework to model 
consumption behaviour of households. As such the permanent income and 
life-cycle theories have spawned a large theoretical and empirical literature in 
macroeconomics. On the theoretical part there are hybrid models which try to 
blend both permanent income and life-cycle motives to come up with a richer 
and more realistic theory of consumption. Empirical papers try to test 
whether the theoretical predictions of these models can be validated in the 
data. 
Friedman strongly believed in the proportionality hypothesis i.e., household 
of all levels of lifetime income save a constant proportion of their permanent 
income. He claimed that the observed positive correlation between savings 
and income is spurious. As we can only observe current income and it is 
prone to transitory shocks, the observed correlation between savings and 
current income is simply the result of a household trying to smooth 
consumption over its lifetime. The life-cycle model on the other hand predicts 
that agents will save primarily during the middle stages of their life. The 
savings in these years of their life will be used to pay off debt incurred when 
young for education and to fund consumption during retirement. Thus, it is 
possible to observe different savings behaviour among agents with the same 
lifetime income. It is simply due to the fact that different households in the 
economy at a given point in time could be at different stages of their life 
cycle.  
In a recent paper, Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (DSZ hereafter) (2004) show 
that with reasonable parametric specifications of the permanent income, the 
life cycle and the hybrid models, it is impossible to reconcile with the savings 
behaviour in U.S.A. Using a variety of data sets, the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), DSZ find that savings rates are 
increasing with permanent income. This is even after controlling for life-
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cycle characteristics of the households. This could potentially also explain the 
very high degree of wealth concentration in U.S.A.1  
In this paper, we propose a plausible theoretical channel which may explain 
savings heterogeneity in an economy. We study the role played by the rate of 
time preference of individuals, i.e., the level of patience in determining their 
savings behaviour. The level of patience of an individual is an important 
aspect of her preferences. Let us explain with the help of an example. If an 
agent is maximizing welfare over two periods say t = 0 and t = 1, it is 
customary to represent her preference as  
)()( 10 cucu β+ ’ where u(.) is the period utility function and c0, c1 are the 
level of consumption in periods 0 and 1. The parameter β ∈ (0,1) is 
commonly referred to as the subjective discount factor or the level of patience. 
The level of patience is the weight given to future welfare in comparison to 
present welfare. β-1 is called the rate of time preference. A more patient 
individual (i.e., higher β) has less rate of time preference and therefore gives 
more importance to future welfare. Everything else remaining the same, she 
would save a larger proportion of her income. This enables her to accumulate 
more wealth over her lifetime in comparison to an impatient individual.  
Differences in the rate of time preference across individuals can potentially 
explain persistence in inequality. Even if every individual has access to the 
same production technology, inequality could persist in an economy due to 
differences in the rate of time preference across individuals.2 The role of “rate 
of time preference” in explaining inequality, however, has received relatively 
less attention in the theoretical literature.  
In a standard permanent income model like Ben Porath (1967), we allow the 
individual agents to choose their level of patience by consumption of a good 
which we interpret as the “health” good. One possible interpretation of this 
could be that higher consumption of the “health” good increases the 
probability of survival of an agent and makes her give more importance to 
future utility. The positive relationship between consumption and health has 
been well established in the development economics literature. Deaton (2003) 
reports a strong correlation between health status and income both across 
countries and within an economy. If we plot the relation between per-capita 
                                                 
1 See Cagetti and De Nardi (2005). 
2 Becker and Mulligan (1997) first introduced the idea that the level of investment in 
patience can have important bearing on the growth rate of an economy. 
income and life expectancy, we can see a strong correlation between them. In 
U.S.A., the probability of death at the age of 50 for both males and females is 
decreasing in family income.3 This suggests a particular channel through 
which income may affect the “rate of time preference” of an individual. 
Smith (1999) also finds a strong relationship between economic and health 
status of households. While there have been empirical studies on the 
behaviour of savings rates across households, the theoretical work in this area 
is very much limited. For policy analysis, it is essential to have a theoretical 
model that explicitly models the behaviour of the “rate of time preference”. 
The theoretical model is necessary for an empirical purpose as well, because 
it helps identify the important causal relationship – do richer individuals save 
more or, more patient individuals save more and end up rich.  
Our theoretical results show that even when agents in the economy are 
identical in terms of their preferences and have access to the same production 
technology there may be permanent income inequality in steady state. Also, 
richer agents save a larger proportion of their permanent income. Agents who 
consume more of the “health” good are more patient and as such save more. 
This result is consistent with other empirical studies. Lawrance (1991) in her 
study on inter-temporal preferences based on U.S. panel data finds that “rate 
of time preference” is about three to five percentage points higher for 
households with lower incomes than those with higher incomes. Controlling 
for race and education widens this difference even more.  
We then test the prediction of our model using the Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data set. As this dataset is fairly 
recent, we are forced to use an empirical strategy similar to DSZ. There have 
been empirical studies documenting the wealth distribution (Headey et. all 
(2005)) and consumption inequality (Barett et. all (2000)) in Australia. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study documenting the 
savings behaviour in Australia. We find strong evidence in favour of the 
theoretical implication of our model. After controlling for life-cycle 
characteristics of a household, their savings are increasing as households 
move up the permanent income quintiles. We also examine the impact of 
health status of households on their savings behaviour. For every proxy of the 
                                                 
3 See Deaton (2003) for an excellent survey of the literature studying the link 
between health and development. 
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health status of a household, we find that the health status of the head of the 
household has strong positive effect on their savings behaviour.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our 
model and we derive our basic results in section 3. In section 4 we explain 
our empirical strategy and provide details of our data set in section 5. Our 
estimation results are in section 6 and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Model 
Production Technology: 
Consider an economy producing a single homogeneous commodity. Time is 
discrete and is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ….. The economy consists of a 
continuum of infinitely lived agents who differ only in terms of their initial 
endowment of capital k0. Every agent is endowed with one unit labour time at 
each period however they are able to accumulate capital by saving out of 
their income. The final good is produced using a standard neoclassical 
production technology 
)()1,( ttt kfkFy ≡= , 
where (kt,1) denote the amount of capital and labour input employed by an 
agent in the production process in period t.4  The final good produced is 
denoted by  yt .  
(Assumption 1)  The production function f(.) is increasing and 
concave in its argument and satisfies the inada conditions.  
Preferences: 
Our economy consists of agents who are born into dynastic households. The 
main difference of our paper from rest of the literature is the nature of 
preferences of the individual agents. It will be helpful to explain the objective 
function of an agent through a series of steps. First, unlike the standard 
Ramsey model, the agents in our model use their income to consume a 
“utility” good as well as a “health” good. The consumption of “utility” good 
provides the agent with utility at each time period. Let the period utility 
function be denoted by u(ct) where ct is the consumption of “utility” good of 
an agent in period t. We assume that u(.) is increasing and concave in ct and 
satisfies the inada conditions. 
(Assumption 2)  u(0) = 0, u' (.) > 0, u'' (.) < 0. 
                                                 
4 We have normalized the labour time of every agent to 1 for simplicity and as such 
we will denote the production function by f(kt). 
The health good affects the agent’s rate of time preference or the subjective 
discount factor. The role of the health good is best explained by using a 
simple two period example. Suppose an agent was making a consumption 
decision over two time periods say t = 0 and t = 1. In a standard two-period 
model, the agent’s preferences would be given by 
)()( 10 cucu β+ , 
where 0 < β < 1, is the subjective discount factor of an agent. This discount 
factor captures the degree of patience of an agent. In our model, this discount 
factor is determined endogenously instead of being an exogenously given 
parameter. The discount factor depends on the consumption of another kind 
of good called the “health good”.5 In our model the agent’s preferences are 
given by 
)()()( 100 cuxcu β+ , 
where x0 denotes the consumption of the “health” good by an agent in period 
t = 0 and β(.) is an increasing function of x0.  
(Assumption 3) 1)(0 <≤≤< βββ tx , β' (.) > 0, β '' (.) < 0.  
The behaviour of subjective discount factor with respect to the health good is 
shown in Figure 1. The concavity of the function β(.) ensures that the first 
order conditions for the maximum are also sufficient while we need the upper 
and lower bound on the function to ensure that the agent’s infinite horizon 
problem has a non-trivial solution. 
The Agent’s Problem: 
Now we are in a position to state the infinite horizon problem facing an agent. 
An agent is identified by her initial endowment of capital. The agent 
maximizes her lifetime welfare i.e., 
                      ∑∞
=0}{
)(max
t
ttc
cu
t
ρ                          (1) 
subject to a period budget constraint 
              kt+1 = f(kt) + (1-δ)kt – ct – xt,     (2) 
and the evolution of the discount factor given by 
                                       ρt+1 = β(xt)ρt .                     (3) 
The initial conditions are ρ0  = 1 and k0. We should point out that although we 
refer to kt as capital it can be interpreted more generally. It can also be 
                                                 
5 Becker and Mulligan (1997) call this notion as investment in patience. 
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thought of as the innate ability or human capital of an agent without altering 
the motivation of our model. Equation (2) also assumes that the production 
good (yt) can be transformed one for one into consumption good (ct) and the 
health good (xt).6 The Lagrangian for the agent’s problem is given by 
£= 
∑∞
=
++ −+−−−−++
0
11 ]})([])1()([)({
t
tttttttttttt xkxckkfcu ρβρµδλρ . 
The first-order conditions for maximum are: 
∂£/∂ct = 0 ⇒ ρt u' (ct) = λt     (i) 
∂£/∂xt = 0 ⇒ λt = µt ρt β' (xt)     (ii) 
∂£/∂kt+1 = 0 ⇒ λt = λt+1[f ' (kt+1) + (1-δ)]    (iii) 
∂£/∂ρ t+1 = 0 ⇒ u(ct+1) + µt+1 β(xt+1) = µt    (iv) 
From (i), (iii) and (2) we have 
u' (ct) = β(xt) u' (ct+1) [f ' (kt+1) + (1-δ)].                (4) 
Equation (4) is the standard inter-temporal Euler equation except the discount 
factor is a function of the “health” good. With forward substitution equation, 
(iv) can be written as 
µt = u(ct+1) + µt+1 β(xt+1) = u(ct+1) + β(xt+1)[ u(ct+2) + µt+2 β(xt+2)], 
and with repeated substitution µt can be expressed as 
       µt = ∑∞
+=
−
+
1
1
1 )()(
ts
sst cuρρ .       (5) 
µt represents the present discounted value of future welfare of an agent at 
time period t. Using (i), condition (ii) can be written as  
            µt = u' (ct)/β' (xt).                                 (6) 
From (5) and (6), we get 
u' (ct) = β' (xt) ∑∞
+=
−
+
1
1
1 )()(
ts
sst cuρρ .       (7) 
Equation (7) summarizes the trade-off facing an agent between the 
consumption of the “utility” good and the “health” good. At an optimum the 
loss in current welfare from sacrificing the “utility” good must equal the gain 
                                                 
6 In the neo-classical framework it is standard to assume that the production good can 
be transformed one for one into consumption and capital. We have just extended the 
same property to the health good. 
in welfare by consuming the “health” good in the form of the present 
discounted value of future welfare. 
Definition 1: A perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) of an agent are given by 
sequences ∞=0}{ ttc , 
∞
=0}{ ttx , 
∞
=+ 01}{ ttk , such that (2), (4) and (7) hold with 
equality for a given k0. 
 
3. Results 
We will first characterize the steady state equilibria of an agent. At a steady 
state, ct = ct+1 = c, xt = xt+1 = x, and kt = kt+1 = k. Equations (4) and (7) reduce 
to  
           β(x) [f ' (k) + (1-δ)] = 1,                 (4') 
and  
                      
)(1
)(
)(
)(
x
x
cu
cu
β
β
−
′=′ .                     
   (7') 
The left hand side of equation (7') is decreasing in c. However, the right hand 
side of the equation need not be monotonic in x. In order to derive a unique 
relationship between c and x we need to impose some additional restriction 
on the function β(.). 
(Assumption 4)                    )](1)[()]([ 2 xxx βββ −′′−<′  
For a commonly used functional form for β(.) i.e.,  
x
xx ++= 1)( ηββ , 
where β , η, and  β + η < 1, the above condition is satisfied. Assumption 4 
implies that the steady state consumption of the “health” good is a 
monotonically increasing function of the level of “utility” good i.e., x = x(c) 
where x'(c) > 0. A graphical derivation of this relationship is shown in Figure 
2. The positive relationship between economic and health status has been 
well documented in the empirical literature.7 Our model provides a micro 
foundation behind this association.  
At steady state the budget constraint of the agent is 
c + x = f(k) – δk 
or     
                                                 
7 See for instance Smith (1999) and Deaton (2003). 
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                c + x(c) = f(k) – δk.      (2') 
Lemma 1 Let kmax solve f ' (k) = δk. At a steady state solution to an agent’s 
problem, k∈(0, kmax).  
Proof: The inada conditions on u(.) and f(.) ensures that at a steady state an 
agent will always hold some amount of capital. However, an agent will never 
choose to hold more than kmax amount of capital in steady state. Let stock k1 >  
kmax be a steady state level of capital stock. Equation (2') implies that it would 
be possible to maintain the same level of steady state level of “utility” good 
consumption and “health” good consumption with a lesser level of capital 
stock. Thus, it is possible to increase the welfare of an agent by reducing the 
level of capital stock and consuming it. Therefore, k1 cannot be an optimum. 
█ 
Lemma 1 and equation (2') implies that consumption of the “utility” good can 
be expressed as a monotonically increasing function of capital i.e.,  
                       c = g(k),                                        (BC) 
where g'(k) > 0 and k∈(0, kmax). (BC) represents the relationship between c 
and k according to equation (2'). Equation (4') can be expressed as  
      (x(c)) [f '’(k) + (1-δ)] = 1.                   (EE) 
(EE) implicitly defines an increasing monotonic relationship between c and 
k.8 (BC) and (EE) together characterize the steady state equilibrium of an 
agent. Figure 3 shows a possible scenario of steady state equilibrium of an 
agent.  
In Figure 3, we present a scenario where the solution to an agent’s 
problem may have three stationary solutions. The equilibrium an agent 
converges to will depend on her initial endowment of capital. We first present 
some results regarding the existence and number of steady state equilibria. It 
will be helpful to use (BC) to substitute for c in equation (EE) and write the 
steady state condition of an agent as an equation in one variable. Let us 
define  
Φ(k) = β[x(g(k))] [f ' (k) + (1-δ)] – 1. 
Notice when Φ(k) = 0 both (BC) and (EE) conditions for the steady state 
equilibrium are satisfied.  
Proposition 1 There exists at least one steady state solution to an agent’s 
maximization problem. The total number of steady state equilibria is odd. 
                                                 
8 f '(.) is decreasing in k.  As β(.) and x(.) are increasing in their argument it follows 
that for (EE) to hold c must be increasing in k.   
Proof: The function β(.) is bounded below by β. Since f(.) satisfies the inada 
conditions it follows that Φ(0) > 0. As β(.) ≤ β  <1 and f ’(kmax) = δ, it means 
that Φ(kmax) < 0. Continuity of the function Φ(.) implies that there must exist 
at least one k∈(0, kmax) such that Φ(k) = 0. Without loss of generality, 
suppose there exist two steady state equilibria k1 , k2 ∈(0, kmax). Continuity of 
the function Φ(k) implies that there exists a k  < kmax such that Φ( k ) > 0. 
Since Φ(kmax) < 0 it follows that there must exist another steady state k3 ∈( k , 
kmax). Hence, the number of state equilibria is odd. █ 
Figure 4 depicts a scenario where an agent’s optimization problem has three 
possible steady state solutions. kL denotes a low level equilibrium where the 
agent ends up low level of capital and permanent income. kH on the other 
hand is a high level equilibrium where the agent accumulates larger amount 
of capital in steady state and ends up with a higher level of permanent income.  
The significance of the steady state kU will become clear soon.9 
Although it is possible to have more than three steady state equilibria from a 
theoretical standpoint, all the interesting features of the model can be studied 
within such a scenario. Our next proposition characterizes the global 
dynamics of the model.  
Proposition 2 Let kt be the endowment of capital of an agent at time period t. 
If the marginal product of capital exceeds the rate of time preference at kt i.e., 
( ) (1 ) 1 [ ( ( ))]t tf k x g kδ β′ + − >  
the agent will accumulate capital and vice-versa.  
Proof: kt is the endowment of capital of an agent at time period t. If this was 
a steady state, then the equilibrium sequences solving an agent’s 
maximization problem would be given kt+1 = kt; ct = g(kt); and xt = x(g(kt)) for 
all t. We want to show that if ( ) (1 ) 1 [ ( ( ))]t tf k x g kδ β′ + − >   then the 
sequences given above cannot be an optimum. Suppose we consider a one 
time deviation in the consumption of the “utility” good i.e., let tc%  = ct - ε 
where ε is sufficiently small. If we keep xt constant the budget constraint 
equation (2) implies that kt+1 = kt + ε. The loss in utility from foregoing 
                                                 
9 We have ruled out the possibility of the function Φ(.) being tangential to the 
horizontal axis. For a generic class of functions such tangencies will occur with 
probability zero. 
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consumption of ct in period t is given by ( )tu c′ . The foregone consumption is 
accumulated as capital and allows higher level consumption in period t+1. 
The present discounted value of the gain in utility is given 
by ( )][ ( ) (1 )] ( )t t tx f k u cβ δ′ + − . Since ( ) (1 ) 1 ( )t tf k xδ β′ + − >  it follows 
that the agent can increase welfare by consuming less and accumulating more 
capital. A similar argument can be applied to show that the capital stock is 
decreasing when ( ) (1 ) 1 [ ( ( ))]t tf k x g kδ β′ + − > . █ 
Proposition 4 helps in understanding which equilibrium will be reached by an 
agent in long run. It implies that an agent will accumulate capital when Φ(k) 
> 0 while she will reduce her capital stock when Φ(k) < 0. Hence, the steady 
state an agent attains in long run depends on her initial endowment of capital. 
This dynamics is depicted in Figure 5.  
Agents who have initial endowment of capital less than kU (i.e., k0 < 
kU) will converge to the low level steady state kL. Those agents with initial 
endowment above kU will converge to the high level equilibrium kH.  
This result warrants some explanation. In a standard Keynes-Ramsey model, 
every agent is assumed to have the same degree of patience i.e., the same 
subjective discount factor β. Hence, every agent accumulates capital until the 
marginal return from capital equals the rate of time preference i.e.,  
1( ) (1 )f k δ β −′ + − = . 
In our model, the degree of patience of an agent is endogenously 
determined. The subjective discount factor of an agent depends on the level 
of consumption of the “health” good. Hence, it is possible for an agent to 
have a very low endowment of capital (and a high marginal product of capital) 
and choose to reduce her capital stock due to a high rate of time preference.  
In Figure 5, kU acts as the threshold level of capital needed to induce an agent 
to accumulate capital and reach the high capital steady state kH. Let Ψ0(k0) 
denote the initial distribution of capital in the economy. From Proposition 2, 
it follows that Ψ(kU) proportion of the agents in the population will converge 
to kL while (1 – Ψ(k0)) will converge kH level of capital. With endogenous 
rate of time preference, it is possible to have inequality in permanent income 
even though agents are identical in terms of their preferences and have access 
to the same production technology.  
 So far in our analysis we have not allowed for any kind of 
uncertainty. That is why we end up with a two point distribution in steady 
state. However, it is quite easy to incorporate some form of uncertainty in the 
production function without altering the qualitative nature of our results. For 
instance, let the production function take the following form 
)()1,( ttttt kfkFy θθ ≡= , 
where θt is identically and independently distributed with a distribution 
function ξ(θt). The long run distribution of capital is shown in Figure 6. In the 
neighbourhood of the non-stochastic steady states there exits rational 
expectations equilibrium. The shaded region mirrors the density function of θt. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The ideal way to test the empirical validity of our model would be to estimate 
the Euler equation generated by an agent’s optimizing behaviour given by 
equation  
u' (ct) = β(xt) u' (ct+1) [f '’(kt+1) + (1-δ)].                (4) 
This requires a large panel data set with detailed breakdown of the household 
expenditures and wealth. Unfortunately, even the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) dataset, a commonly used dataset in this literature has very 
limited data on household expenditures. It mainly consists of food and 
household rent. We face a similar paucity of data for Australia as well. 
However, there is another implication of our model which is possible to test 
by using with cross-sectional techniques.  
Proposition 3 Agents with higher permanent income have higher savings 
rates.  
Proof: The steady state savings rate is given by [ ]( ) ( ) ( )s k f k x c f k= − − . 
Using equation (2'), the savings rate can be written as: ( ) ( )s k k f kδ= . 
From the concavity of f(.), it follows that an agent with higher permanent 
income i.e., kH > kL, also has a higher savings rate i.e., s(kH) > s(kL). █ 
This prediction is totally consistent with evidence provided by DSZ (2004). 
Using a wide variety of data sets for U.S.A., they find strong evidence that 
households with higher permanent income save a larger proportion of their 
income.  
In this paper, we test whether such a relationship exits in Australia. Even 
with a simple testable hypothesis as ours, one needs to be careful. First, we 
are interested in the effect of a household’s permanent (not current) income 
on saving. The problem with permanent income is that it is inherently 
unobservable. To deal with this, we use a two stage procedure as in DSZ 
(2004). In the first stage, we regress current income on age dummies and 
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instruments which would be good predictors of permanent income. The fitted 
values from this regression are used as a proxy for permanent income. Then, 
we divide the distribution of fitted values up into quintiles and create dummy 
variables for each quintile. As argued in DSZ (2004), using these dummies as 
regressors allows for nonlinearities in the saving–income relationship. 
Having come up with a measure of permanent income, we are faced with 
another problem. How do we measure the savings behaviour of a household? 
We consider two possible variables. First is an active measure of savings: the 
savings rate. It is simply calculated by deducting household expenditures 
from income and divided by the household income. With this being the 
dependent variable, in the second stage, we run a median regression10 where 
regressors are permanent income quintile dummies, age dummies, and other 
control variables. We also consider another measure of savings behaviour 
which is a self-reported qualitative variable. This variable takes discrete 
values between 0, 1, and 2 based on a household’s self-assessment of their 
savings habit. Having this as the dependent variable, in the second stage, we 
estimate a multinomial logit model with same regressors in the median 
regression. 
5. Data Description 
For our estimation, we use the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia Survey (HILDA)11. HILDA is the first large-scale panel data set in 
Australia and has covered the period from 2001 to 2003 at the time of this 
study. It initially provided information on 19,914 individuals and annually 
asks individuals a wide range of questions regarding income, work, health 
conditions, and socio-economic backgrounds. In what follows, we discuss 
how a measure of saving rate and a measure of saving habits are constructed 
and also discuss other variables used in this study. 
Saving Rate 
The “true” saving rate is not straightforward to measure for various reasons. 
First, there are several saving measures that we may use and there is no clear-
cut answer for which measure we should use. For example, one measure is 
“active” saving which is the difference between after-tax income and 
consumption. Another is the change in net wealth, which would include all 
                                                 
9 A median regression minimises the sum of absolute deviations of the error. It is 
well known that a median regression is robust to outliers, compared to least squares. 
10 More specifically, we use the unit-record data from the HILDA survey. 
aspects of saving. Each saving measure may yield a substantially different 
saving rate. Second, the saving rate depends on whether we calculate it at an 
individual or household level and for each level it must be measured in a 
different way. Finally, the saving rate also depends on whether or not we 
measure a gross or a net saving rate. If we calculate the net saving rate, then 
we must deduct consumption of fixed capital from gross (DSZ 2004). 
It would be ideal to use various saving measures and to verify that findings 
are robust across different measures. Due to data limitations, however, we 
only have one saving measure available: the active saving measure. We 
define the saving rate to be the difference between household income (net of 
taxes) and consumption, all divided by after-tax household income. 12 
Consumption is defined as the sum of food consumption (i.e., grocery 
spending and spending on meals outside the home) and rental expenses. If 
households do not rent but instead own a mortgage, these loan repayments 
are used to proxy for rental expenses. We admit that the constructed saving 
rate is very crude, but this limited measure is due to the lack of detailed 
information on consumption in HILDA. 
When constructing the data set, we restrict households to those containing 
‘typical’ families – childless couples, couples with children, lone parents with 
children and single-person families, all of which do not have any other family 
or non-family members living with them. The head of the household is 
defined as the oldest male in households with couples and the lone parent in 
lone-parent families13. Since we cannot determine the head of the household 
for all same-sex couples based on our definition of the household head, these 
families are excluded from the sample even if they have previously had 
children with former partners. 
In addition, we exclude any households with negative disposable income to 
ensure that negative saving rates occur only when consumption is greater 
than income. We also eliminate any households that have saving rates of less 
                                                 
11 It would be best to use the proportion of current saving relative to the permanent 
income as the saving rate. However, since data on permanent income is inherently 
unavailable, we use current after-tax income as the denominator. This may not be too 
much of a problem. Dynan, et al. (2004) test the sensitivity of a change in the 
denominator for their active saving measures and find that their results are quite 
robust. 
12 Obviously, a single person gets head of the household status.  
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than minus fifty percent, because we presume that any value below this is 
unsustainable and therefore, erroneous. Finally, we do not use data for 2002 
since no questions on food consumption were asked in that year. Having done 
this gives us the final sample of 5838 households for 2001 and 5420 
households for 2003. 
Saving Behaviour 
To construct a measure of saving habits, we use a survey question about 
saving habits in HILDA. In the question, respondents are given five options 
to choose from: (i) Don’t save: usually spend more than income, (ii) Don’t 
save: usually spend about as much as income, (iii) Save whatever is left over 
at the end of the month – no regular plan, (iv) Spend regular income, save 
other income, and (v) Save regularly by putting money aside. We construct a 
variable named SAVING that takes on three values14: 0 if the individual 
chose either option (i) or (ii); 1 if the individual chose option (iii); and 2 if the 
individual chose either option (iv) or (v). We restrict the sample similarly 
with the saving rate. Unlike the saving rate, all three waves of the survey 
contain information on saving habits. This results in a larger sample of 7,025 
households with heads aged sixteen and above and 15,855 observations. 
Health Variables 
In the theoretical model, individuals can consume a “health” good which 
determines their subjective discount factor, as well as consuming a “utility” 
good. We thus feel it important to control for health status of a household. 
Using questions in HILDA, we construct several health variables. The first 
variable is constructed to proxy for health: a dummy variable that takes one if 
the head of the household smoked at the time of the survey. There has been 
much research on the relationship between smoking and its contribution to 
poor health (see, for example, Smith and Johnson, 1997), which makes it 
relevant as an indicator of the health status. The second measure of health is a 
dummy variable that takes one if the head of the household reported that he 
was in poor health. The third measure of health is also a dummy variable that 
takes one if the respondent considered him/herself as having a long-term 
health condition, disability or other impairment. 
 
                                                 
13 The saving variable was originally constructed to take on five discrete values 
between 0-4. However, when we estimated the logit model with savings taking five 
values, the predictive power of the model was very poor. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics with definitions of variables used in this 
study. Table 2 presents summary statistics of saving rates, income, smoking 
status, and health status across current income quintiles. All figures are 
expressed as percentages, except for income which is reported in 2001 dollars. 
We can glean several interesting information from these tables. First, saving 
rates increase across the current income distribution. For example, in 2001, 
the median saving rate is 40 percent for the lowest quintile group and reaches 
75 percent for the highest quintile group. Second, the median saving rate for 
each quintile is substantially high. This is entirely due to the lack of detailed 
information on consumption in HILDA as mentioned earlier. Finally, health 
status improves across current income quintiles, except when we use smoking 
status as a proxy for health status. The smoking rate peaks in the third 
quintile and then falls dramatically.  
Table 3 presents the distribution of saving habits and health status across 
current income quintiles. All figures are expressed as percentages. A casual 
look at the table suggests that the rich tend to have “better” saving habits. The 
proportion of households that follow a regular saving plan rises 
monotonically across the income distribution. 23 percent of households in the 
lowest quintile follow a regular saving plan and 41 percent in the highest 
quintile. In contrast, the proportion of households that do not save falls as 
income increases. 41 percent in the lowest quintile do not save, 30 percent in 
the third, and only 17 percent in the highest quintile.  
Despite the clear-cut patterns observed in the data, one should not 
immediately conclude that the rich save more and have better saving habits. It 
is well known that saving rates are likely to be positively correlated with 
current income; those who have higher (lower) transitory income will save 
more (less) in anticipation of future reductions (increases) in their income 
(Friedman, 1957). Hence, we are required to examine permanent income, not 
current income, to draw a conclusion on the relationship between saving and 
income. 
6. Estimation Results 
For the first stage of estimation, as an instrument, we use a dummy for the 
head of the household having completed only secondary education and a 
dummy for him/her having completed tertiary education. Education, which is 
relatively stable across an individual’s lifetime and is positively correlated 
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with permanent income, has often been used as a proxy for permanent 
income (see, for example, Zellner, 1960; DSZ., 2004). Several other variables 
have also been used as instruments in the literature. For example, DSZ (2004) 
also use future labour income, lagged labour income and consumption as well 
as education. However, data limitations prevent us from using those other 
instruments. Our three-year panel makes it impossible to use future and 
lagged income as instruments. In addition, consumption used in this study is 
very crude as discussed earlier and hence we do not use it as an instrument. 
As a result, we are left only with education dummies as instruments. We 
compute standard errors of the parameters by bootstrapping the entire two 
step procedures. The number of bootstrap replications is 1,000. 
 For the multinominal logit estimation, we have four groups of 
individuals: (i) N1 individuals that participated in the survey just once (group 
1), (ii) N2 individuals that participated in the survey twice in a row (group 2), 
(iii) N3 individuals that participated in the survey twice not in a row (group 3), 
and (iv) N4 individuals that participated in the survey three times in a row 
(group 4). To preserve the dependence structure of the panel, we sample Nj 
individuals with replacement from groups j, j = 1,…,4. 
6.1 Estimation Results: Median Regression 
We run median regressions for 2001 and 2003 separately. Estimation results 
are reported in Table 4. The first and third columns contain the 2001 and 
2003 results from the baseline model, where regressors are permanent income 
quintile dummies, age dummies, and the gender dummy. Similarly, the 
second and fourth columns contain the 2001 and 2003 results from the model 
with additional explanatory variables: whether the respondent smoked, 
whether the respondent was in poor health, whether the respondent had a 
long-term health condition, how many children the respondent had, and 
whether the respondent was retired.  
The results provide strong evidence in favour of the theory. The saving rate 
increases across the permanent income distribution. In the baseline model 
with 2001 data, the coefficient on every quintile but the fifth is significantly 
greater than that on the previous quintile. When adding more control 
variables, the pattern becomes even stronger; the coefficients are always 
increasing across the permanent income quintiles. In both specifications, the 
highest quintile has a 12-13% higher saving rate than the lowest quintile. We 
also observe a similar pattern for 2003, suggesting the robustness of the 
results across years. 
The coefficients on age dummies suggest that households save more as heads 
become older. It might be odd that households with heads aged 61 or above 
save more than those with heads less than 60. This finding runs contrary to 
the life-cycle theory of consumption. Life-cycle theory predicts that 
households should start dissaving as they age. We can conjecture a couple of 
explanations. First, our household data is a fairly recent one. The savings of 
the households with heads over the age of 61 could be higher due to generous 
tax benefits of superannuation contributions. Another possible explanation 
behind this behaviour could be the increase in average life expectancy in 
Australia.  
The coefficients on the smoking dummy, the poor health dummy, and the 
long-term health condition dummy are all negative and significant (except 
that on the poor health dummy for 2003), suggesting that an improvement in 
the health status of household heads leads to a positive effect on their saving 
rate.  
6.2 Estimation Results: Multinomial Logit Model  
Estimation results are presented as in Table 5. The first column in each 
choice category corresponds to the baseline model and the second column to 
the model with additional regressors. The coefficients for SAVE being 0 are 
all normalized to zero for identification and therefore not presented in the 
table. We compute the marginal effect of j (j=2,3,4,5) the permanent income 
quintile dummy as follows: ( ) ( )1 1| , 1, 0, 0 , 1 | , 0, 1, 0 , 1 ,j j l j j lP Y k X D D D l j j P Y k X D D D l j j− −= = = = ∀ ≠ − − = = = = ∀ ≠ −  
for each individual and then average it over individuals, where Y  is the 
dependent variable ( )0,1,2Y = , jD  is the jth permanent income quintile 
dummy, and X  are a vector of other regressors. For the 1st permanent 
quintile dummy, we compute  
( ) ( )1 1| , 1, 0 1 | , 0, 0 1 .l lP Y k X D D l P Y k X D D l= = = ∀ ≠ − = = = ∀ ≠  
As can be see in the table, the probability of the household not saving at all 
decreases across permanent income quintiles. For example, from the second 
quintile to the third, the probability decreases by 0.077 Likewise, from the 
third quintile to the fourth, it decreases by 0.073. Contrastingly, the 
probability of the household following a regular saving plan rises as the 
permanent income increases. The probability increases by 0.041 when 
permanent incomes increase from the first quintile to the second, and by 
0.072 from the third to the fourth. Overall, households are more likely to 
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follow a saving plan and are less likely to not save, as they have higher 
permanent income. There is no clear-cut pattern regarding the relationship 
between ages and saving habits except the highest age group. The marginal 
effects of being 61 or older (relative to being 30 or below) suggest that as 
household heads age, households are more likely to follow a saving plan. 
 Even after controlling for other factors, we observe the same pattern 
in the baseline model; households tend to have better saving habits as their 
permanent income are higher. The probability of the household following a 
saving plan increases by 0.046 and by 0.035 as the permanent income move 
from the second quintile to the third and from the forth to the fifth, 
respectively. On the other hand, the probability of not saving at all decreases 
by 0.059 and by 0.050 when the permanent income increases from the second 
quintile to the third and from the third to the fourth, respectively.  
The results strongly suggest that households are less likely to save at all when 
heads have poor health. Being in poor health condition as well as having 
smoking habits will increase the probability of not saving at all by more than 
10 percent. The effect of having a long-term health condition or disability is 
not as strong, but still increases the probability by 6.5 per.  
Whether the head of the household is retired does not appear to affect saving 
habits. One may argue that households with retired heads have different 
saving habits than those with non-retired ones. To see whether this is indeed 
the case, we remove retired individuals from the sample and re-estimate the 
models. Though not presenting the results, we again observe the same pattern: 
households with higher permanent income are more likely to follow a regular 
savings plan than those with lower permanent income. Overall, the results are 
quite robust; the rich have better saving habits. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have provided a micro foundation behind increase in savings 
rates with permanent income. Our theoretical framework also can explain the 
existence of inequality in an economy even when agents are identical in terms 
of their preferences and have access to the same technology. We also test the 
implication of our model for Australia. We find that savings are increasing 
with permanent income. We also find a strong relationship between health 
and savings behaviour.  
Recent empirical studies do show an increase in income inequality in many 
developed countries such as U.S.A., U.K. and Australia.15 In that context, our 
findings have significant implications for Australia especially regarding 
macroeconomic and government policies such as support for healthcare. Our 
model can be extended in future to analyse the impact of various revenue 
neutral tax policies. A particular policy instrument worth investigating is the 
GST. A sales tax would increase the tax burden for poorer section of the 
society as they consume larger proportion of their income than those affluent 
whose saving ratio is higher. It may also lead to a higher level of inequality.  
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9. Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Subjective Discount Factor   
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Figure 3: Steady state Equilibria   
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Figure 5: Global Stability    
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Figure 6: Distribution of Capital with Uncertainty    
 
                    
                  Φ(k)                                                                           
 
                                                                                                  
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                               
                         0             kL                  kU                    kH                       kmax      k 
                                                                    
 
 
                                             
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
  15
Table 1: Summary Statistics with Definitions of Variables  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Definition 
Saving  0.998 0.773 0 (don’t save), 1 (save left-over), and 2 (follow saving plan) 
Income  44290 36056 Real Disposable Income (2001 $) 
Tertiary education   0.629 0.483 1 if having completed tertiary education 
Secondary education 0.084 0.278 1 if having completed secondary education 
Ages 31-40 0.218 0.413 1 if respondent is between 31 and 40 
Ages 41-50 0.235 0.424 1 if respondent is between 41 and 50 
Ages 51-60 0.173 0.379 1 if respondent is between 51 and 60 
Ages 61 or above 0.234 0.424 1 if respondent is 61 or above 
Female 0.232 0.422 1 if respondent is female 
Smoke 0.234 0.423 1 if respondent smokes 
Poor health 0.038 0.191 1 if respondent is in poor health condition 
Long-term health 0.265 0.441 1 if respondent has a long-term health condition or disability 
# Children 1.912 1.525 Number of children respondent has had that are still alive 
Retired 0.205 0.404 1 if respondent is retired 
 
Table2: Saving Rates and Health across Income Quintiles 
  Year Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Average saving rate 2001 -118.02 52.32 60.5 67.4 74.85 
 2003 -23.5 56.05 61.47 67.16 74.66 
Median saving rate 2001 40.81 56.66 62.17 68.86 76.62 
 2003 45.71 59.71 62.68 68.28 76.9 
Median income (2001$) 2001 10820 22320 35121 51401 78968 
 2003 11934 23483 36377 52765 81506 
Smoke 2001 26.05 28.25 29.45 25.45 17.81 
 2003 24.17 24.11 24.9 20.9 13.84 
Poor health 2001 8.91 6.08 3.25 1.46 1.71 
 2003 7.33 5.65 3.05 3.05 1.05 
Long-term health 2001 49.96 34.5 22.6 14.48 13.87 
  2003 48.81 38.56 26.43 19.85 16.98 
Note: All figures are percentages, except for income which is reported in 2001 dollars. 
 
Table 3: Saving Behaviour and Health across Income Quintiles 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Don’t save 40.58 38.03 30.72 23.56 17.14 
Save left-over income 36.73 37.34 41.44 43.85 41.65 
Follow saving plan 22.69 24.63 27.85 32.59 41.21 
Smoke 25.34 27.85 25.73 22.49 15.44 
Note: All figures are percentages. 
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Table 4: Median Regression of Saving Rate on Permanent Income Quintiles 
 Variable 2001 (# Obs = 5838) 2003 (# Obs = 5420) 
0.4884*** 0.5317*** 0.5051*** 0.5165*** Quintile 1  
(-0.0309) (-0.0265)  (0.0282) (0.0240) 
0.5237*** 0.5717***  0.5369*** 0.5570*** Quintile 2 
(-0.0232) ††† (-0.0156) †† (0.0146) † (0.0158) †† 
0.5792*** 0.5966***  0.5711*** 0.5988*** Quintile 3 
(-0.0134) ††† (-0.0121) †† (0.0110) †† (0.0097) ††† 
0.6147*** 0.6355*** 0.6023*** 0.6224*** Quintile 4 
(-0.014) †† (-0.0106) †† (0.0195) †† (0.0152) †† 
0.6194*** 0.6564*** 0.6237*** 0.6298*** Quintile 5 
(-0.0159) (-0.0125) †† (0.0231) † (0.0173) 
0.0034 0.0027 0.0039 0.0110 Ages 31-40 
(-0.015) (-0.0121) (0.0201)  (0.0158) 
0.0594*** 0.0666*** 0.0378**  0.0612*** Ages 41-50 
(-0.0157) (-0.0126) (0.0216) (0.0173) 
0.1382*** 0.1448***  0.1254***  0.1463*** Ages 51-60 
(-0.0132) (-0.0116) (0.0203) (0.0175) 
0.1964*** 0.1844*** 0.1860*** 0.2169*** Ages 61 & above 
(-0.0228) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0161) 
-0.0595*** -0.0694*** -0.0251 -0.0406*** Female 
(-0.0179) (0.0152) (0.0248) (0.0168) 
 -0.0265***  -0.0262*** Smoke 
 (0.0091)  (0.0108) 
 -0.0498**  -0.0082 Poor health 
 (0.0091)  (0.0259) 
 -0.0196*  -0.0289*** Long-term health 
 (0.0112)  (0.0098) 
 -0.0101***  -0.0085*** # Children 
 (0.002)  (0.0026) 
 0.0042  0.0081 Retired 
  (0.0131)   (0.0180) 
 
Note: Bootstrap standard deviations are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** beside coefficients indicate statistical significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  †, ††, and ††† beside standard deviations of parameters for quintile dummies  
indicate that the coefficient is significantly greater than that for previous quintile at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.   
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Table 5: Multinomial Logit Model (The Dependent Variable: Save = 0,1,2) 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect 
 Save = 1 Save = 2 Save = 0 Save = 1 Save = 2 
-0.180 0.162 -0.727*** 0.035 0.090*** -0.025 0.032 0.033 -0.121*** -0.008 Quintile 1 
(0.165) (0.145) (0.180) (0.164) (0.034) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (-0.025) (0.024) 
-0.210* 0.282*** -0.506*** 0.222** -0.015 -0.032 -0.026 0.009 0.041** 0.023 Quintile 2 
(0.112) (0.094) (0.142) (0.106) (0.032) (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) 
0.118 0.513*** -0.121 0.584*** -0.077** -0.059*** 0.036 0.013 0.041 0.046*** Quintile 3 
(0.168) (0.086) (0.232) (0.092) (0.032) (0.017) (0.027) (0.017) (0.027) (0.017) 
0.396** 0.838*** 0.379 0.770*** -0.073** -0.050*** 0.001 0.054*** 0.072** -0.004 Quintile 4 
(0.194) (0.108) (0.247) (0.111) (0.030) (0.015) (0.038) (0.020) (0.029) (0.020) 
0.537** 0.738*** 0.418 0.866*** -0.016 0.003 0.028 -0.038* -0.012 0.035** Quintile 5 
(0.226) (0.122) (0.305) (0.134) (0.027) (0.017) (0.056) (0.020) (0.043) (0.017) 
-0.271* -0.149 -0.452* -0.302*** 0.073* 0.042** -0.013 0.0003 -0.06* -0.043*** Ages 31-40 
(0.163) (0.094) (0.245) (0.104) (0.040) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.034) (0.017) 
-0.122 0.108 -0.379 -0.118 0.047 -0.003 0.015 0.040** -0.062 -0.037** Ages 41-50 
(0.220) (0.102) (0.322) (0.114) (0.051) (0.018) (0.037) (0.020) (0.046) (0.018) 
0.227 0.428*** 0.118 0.415*** -0.036 -0.079*** 0.04 0.049** -0.004 0.030 Ages 51-60 
(0.177) (0.105) (0.251) (0.112) (0.039) (0.017) (0.028) (0.021) (0.037) (0.019) 
0.794*** 1.010*** 0.725*** 0.905*** -0.143*** -0.170*** 0.095**** 0.120*** 0.048* 0.051** Ages 61 & above 
(0.120) (0.117) (0.157) (0.127) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.02) 
-0.144 -0.202** 0.212 -0.055 -0.003 0.028 -0.060** -0.041 0.063** 0.013 Female 
(0.144) (0.096) (0.173) (0.108) (0.028) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019) 
 -0.466***  -0.788***   0.125***  -0.024***  -0.101*** Smoke 
 (0.065)  (0.073)   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011) 
 -0.395***  -0.677***   0.107***  -0.022  -0.085*** Poor health 
 (0.111)  (0.143)   (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
 -0.286***  -0.376***   0.065***  -0.024*  -0.042*** Long-term health 
 (0.071)  (0.076)   (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
 -0.129***  -0.184***   0.030***  -0.008**  -0.022*** # Children 
 (0.019)  (0.022)   (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
 -0.042  0.018   0.003  -0.012  0.009 Retired 
  (0.103)   (0.115)   (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.019) 
Log-likelihood:  -17028.3   (baseline model) 
                                                                                                                                   -16693.1   (extended model) 
  
Note: Bootstrap standard deviations are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Year dummies are included, though not reported 
here. 
 
